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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 1
The University of New Hampshire School of Law
(UNH Law, formerly Franklin Pierce Law Center)
has a long history of intellectual property expertise.
UNH Law has an established Intellectual Property
Amicus Brief Clinic that has filed amicus briefs for
this Court as well as lower courts. With faculty
guidance and student participation, the Clinic seeks
to file amicus briefs that will lead to the development
and predictable application of intellectual property
law to promote innovation and fair competition. The
Clinic submits briefs for selected cases with the hope
of contributing important perspectives that might not
be adequately represented by the parties.

INTRODUCTION
This case has been litigated on the assumption that the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 704(b)
whether as a facial matter or as applied to the false
statement of fact that respondent Xavier Alvarez
admits to having made, turns on whether the statement falls within a "categor[y] of speech . . . fully
1

Counsel for each party has provided the Intellectual
Property Amicus Brief Clinic of the University of New Hampshire School of Law with written consent to the filing of this
amicus brief. No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole
or in part, and no person other than amicus curiae, its members
or its counsel made a monetary contribution to its preparation or
submission.
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outside the protection of the First Amendment."
United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1586 (2010);
see also id. at 1584 (stating that the categories of
speech that may be restricted on the basis of content
without regard to First Amendment protections "includ[e] obscenity, defamation, fraud, incitement, and
speech integral to criminal conduct") (citations omitted). A di~ded panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit determined that Alvarez's statement did not fall within such a category after analysis of whether the statement could be regarded as
defamatory; fraudulent, or integral to criminal conduct. See generally United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d
1198 (9th Cir. 2010). Concluding that it could not be
so regarded, the panel applied the strict scrutiny test
applicable to ordinary content-based speech restrictions and held the statute facially unconstitutional.
Id. at 1215-18. Dissenting, Judge Bybee voted to uphold the statute, both facially and as applied, on the
ground that false statements of fact such as those
proscribed by§ 704(b) constitute a category of speech
that falls outside of the First Amendment's protection
"except in a limited set of contexts where such protection is necessary 'to protect speech that matters.'" Id.
at 1218-19 (Bybee, J., dissenting) (quoting Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974)).
The undersigned do not address the issues that
divided the Ninth Circuit panel. Rather, the undersigned call to the Court's attention an alternative,
narrower line of analysis that bears on the constitutional validity of applying § 704(b) to those, such as

-----------------·---------

3·
Alvarez, who falsely claim to have received the Congressional Medal of Honor. The undersigned submit
this brief solely to assist the Court in making a fully
informed assessment of the question presented; they
recognize that the government did not defend the
statute on the narrow basis advanced, and they take
no position on the proper disposition of this particular
case.

.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Prohibiting false association or affiliation is an
objective of trademark law, which imposes civil and
criminal penalties on those who infringe valid trademarks. The phrase "Congressional Medal of Honor"
may plausibly be understood to perform a trademark
function by distinguishing recipients of the nation's
highest military honor - those who compose the
federally-chartered collective organization known as
the Congressional Medal of Honor Society - from
non-recipients. Accordingly, the phrase "Congressional
Medal of Honor" may function as a valid collective
membership mark, the infringement of which may
constitutionally be regulated by measures that satisfy
the variants of intermediate First Amendment scrutiny employed in San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc.
v. United States Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522,
535-41 (1987) (rejecting a First Amendment challenge
to a federal statute authorizing the United States
Olympic Committee to prohibit certain commercial

4

and promotional uses -0f the Committee's trademarks,
including the word "Olympic").
If§ 704(b) were construed to be a measure regulating, inter alia, the infringement of the "Congressional Medal of Honor" collective membership mark,
the constitutionality of its application to those who
falsely claim to have been awarded the Medal could
be assessed under the analysis prescribed in San
Francisco Arts & Athletics. 2 Under that analysis, the
First Amendment permits the prohibition of falsely
claiming to have been awarded the Medal. Taking
such a narrow decisional tack would obviate any need
to answer the broad and ramified question of whether
false statements of fact are categorically beyond the
reach of the First Amendment except in circumstances where they are necessary to protect speech that
matters. In any event, in deciding the question_ presented, the Court should be aware of the potential
applicability of trademark law and consider the
potential effects of its ruling on such law.

2

The undersigned recognize that the parties dispute
whether 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) contains a scienter requirement, and
that additional constitutional questions could arise if the statute
were read not to contain such a requirement. The undersigned
do not take a position on this dispute; instead, they confine
their argument to how the constitutionality of§ 704(b) should
be assessed for First Amendment purposes if the statute were
treated as a measure prohibiting, inter alia, infringement of the
collective membership mark.

r
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ARGUMENT
I.
1

1

18 U.S.C. § 704(b) Bans False Statements
of Association or Affiliation

On May 5, 2008, Xavier Alvarez pled guilty to
one count of falsely claiming to have received the
Congressional Medal of Honor, the nation's highest
military honor. The charge arose out of a public
statement that he made almost a year earlier, when,
introducing himself as a newly-elected member of the
local water board in Pomona, California,. he claimed
to be a Medal recipient. In truth, Alvarez is not a
recipient of the Medal and has never served in the
U.S. Armed Forces. Alvarez's oral claim to be one of
an elite group of combat heroes creates exactly the
sort of false association that Congress sought to
curtail in the 2006 amendment of 18 U.S.C. § 704,
known as the Stolen Valor Act, codified in pertinent
part at 18 U.S.C. §§ 704(b)-(c). 3 Until the 2006 amendment, § 704 prohibited falsely identifying oneself with
Medal recipients but only insofar as such conduct
took the form of wearing or displaying an actual
Medal or colorable imitation of the Medal. Supporters
of the amendment sought to extend the reach of the
criminal statute to encompass knowing false verbal or
written representations about one's receipt of the

Stolen Valor Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-437, § 2(1), (3),
120 Stat. 3266, 3266 (2006). The Act covers false claims with
regard to other military medals and decorations in addition to
the Congressional Medal of Honor.
3

{
I

6
Medal, in order to close a perceived gap in the statutory scheme. 4
Prior to passage of the Act, Congress estimated
that over 250 imposters existed who were beyond the
reach of the law because their false claims of receiving the Medal were purely oral or written in nature. 5
In fact, an additional count against Alvarez charged
him with making the same false oral representation
in a meeting with the Pomona Police Officer's Association in November 2005 when he was seeking the
group's endorsement of his candidacy for mayor of
Pomona. 6 The second count was dismissed, however,
4

One of the authors of the legislation, U.S. Representative
John Salazar, offered the following observations about the proposed amendment:
Current law basically allows Federal law enforcement to prosecute individuals who physically wear
medals on their person. The problem has been occurring where individuals are claiming to have earned
these medals and there is no way for authorities to
be able to prosecute these individuals. These frauds
and these phonies have diminished the meaning and
the honor of the recognitions received by our military
heroes.
In addition to diminishing the meaning, on
several occasions phonies have used their stature as a
decorated war hero to gain credibility that allows
them to commit more serious frauds.
152 CONG. REC. H8821 (2006) (statement of Rep. Salazar).
5
Id. at 8820.
6
See Afvarez to Face More Charges, SAN GABRIEL VALLEY
TRIBUNE, Jan. 13, 2008; First Superseding Information, United
States v. Alvarez, No. 07-0135(A)-ER (C.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2008).

I

t
'
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apparently because Alvarez's November 2005 statement was made before the amendment's 2006 effective date. 7 Passage of the Act put false claimants such
as Alvarez within the reach of federal prosecutors.

II.

Trademark Law Regulates False Statements of Association or Affiliation

Generally, a trademark functions to distinguish
the goods or services of one commercial entity from
those of another. See Hanover Star Milling Co. v.
Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412 (1916) (pre-Lanham Act
decision). 8 Judicial enforcement of trademark rights
serves a dual purpose, i.e., protection of consumers
from deception in the marketplace and protection of
the business goodwill engendered by a merchant's use
of a particular mark to sell his goods or advertise his
services. See id. at 412-13. The federal Lanham Act
protects unregistered and federally-registered marks
from infringement which occurs when one party uses
a commercial designation in such a way as to create a
likelihood of confusion with regard to its association
or affiliation with another or with regard to the origin
of their respective goods or services. 9 Likelihood of
7

Judgment and Commitment, United States v. Alvarez, No.
07-0135(A)-ER (C.D. Cal. July 23, 2008).
8
See also 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (Lanham Act definition of
"mark").
9
See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2006) (providing a cause of action for
infringement offederally-registered marks); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(l)(A)
(2006) (providing a cause of action for infringement of unregistered
(Continued on following page)
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confusion is assessed in relation to "ordinary purchasers, buying with ordinary caution," McLean v.
Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 251 (1877), unless the mark in
issue is a collective membership mark, a type of mark
that designates only membership in a specific group
and does not involve purchasers of goods or services,
Carefirst of Maryland, Inc. v. FirstHealth of the Carolinas, Inc., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d 1492, 1512 (T.T.A.B. 2005).
In the latter case, likelihood of confusion is measured
by reference to "relevant persons," i.e., "those persons
or groups of persons for whose benefit the membership mark is displayed." See id. at 1513. The Lanham
Act provides civil remedies for trademark infringement but criminal penalties for the most egregious
form of infringement are also available at the federal
level. 10

marks and unfair competition). Courts analyze likelihood of
confusion by examining and balancing a variety of factors
including, inter alia, the strength of the plaintiff's mark, the
similarity of the parties' marks and their respective goods and
services, evidence of actual confusion in the marketplace, and
the defendant's intent. See generally 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION§ 23:19 (4th ed. 2011).
10
18 U.S.C. § 2320 (2000 & Supp. 2011). See Joint Statement on Trademark Counterfeiting Legislation, 130 CONG. REC.
31,675 (1984) ("[A] counterfeit mark is the most egregious
example of a mark that is 'likely to cause confusion.'").

t·
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III. The Phrase "Congressional Medal of Honor" Performs a Trademark Function
A. "Congressional Medal of Honor'' Distinguishes Recipients of the Nation's Highest Military Honor From Non-Recipients
Congress uses the phrase "Congressional Medal
of Honor" to designate members of the U.S. armed services who, having distinguished themselves through
conspicuous gallantry and disregard for personal
safety while engaged in conflict on behalf of the
nation's military, receive the nation's high~st military
award. The actual title of the honor, awarded by the
President in the name of Congress, is "Medal of
Honor"; the award is made under separate statutory
authorization to members of each branch of the armed
services. 11 Section 704(c)(2) of Title 18 utilizes the
phrase, "Congressional Medal of Honor," as a composite reference to refer to the Medal as awarded to
members of all branches of the armed services, or to
duplicates or replacements of the Medal. 12 In the legislative history of the Stolen Valor Act, Congress
acknowledged that Congressional Medal of Honor
impersonators are motivated by a desire to identify
themselves with the heroic characteristics of actual recipients but explicitly recognized the damaging nature

11

See 10 U.S.C. §§ 3741, 6241 (1999) (Army, naval services);
10 U.S.C. §§ 8741 (1998) (Air Force); 14 U.S.C. § 491 (1996)
(Coast Guard).
12
18 U.S.C. § 704(c)(2) (1996 & Supp. 2011).

10
of such conduct. 13 Whether done to perpetrate fraudulent activity or simply to aggrandize oneself in the
eyes of others, false identification with this distinguished group "denigrates" and "dishonors" the collective members of the group; Congress sought to return
to Medal recipients "the dignity and respect taken by
those who have stolen it" by enacting.the Stolen Valor
Act. 14

I

I

J

B. Recipients of the Medal Compose a Collective Organization, the Congressional
Medal of Honor Society
The Congressional Medal of Honor Society was
organized in 1948 by a group of recipients of the
Medal
for the purpose of providing a common
ground on which all recipients of the Congressional Medal of Honor may meet to preserve the dignity of the Nation's highest
award; to protect the medal and the holders
thereof from exploitation or other improper
action; to provide assistance as may be
needed by holders of the medal and their dependents; to bring- the medal to the attention
of the public wherever possible to inspire the
youth of the Nation; and to serve our country

..

.I

13
14

152 CONG REC. H8820 (2006).
Id. at 8820-21.

11
in all proper ways in peace as its holders did
in time of war. 15
In 1958, the Society became a Title 36 congressionallychartered corporation and its purposes are recited in
the statutory charter, including, inter alia, "to protect
the name of the medal ... from exploitation"16 and "to
protect, uphold, and preserve the dignity" of the
Medal at all times. 17 Membership in the Society is
restricted to recipients of the Medal and no honorary
memberships are allowed. 18 The Society possesses the
usual corporate powers, but the Society, i'ts directors
and officers, are restricted by statute from participating in any political activity. 19 Today, the Society
provides a platform for its members to engage in
educational outreach, fundraising for scholarships,
and a variety of other initiatives in furtherance of the
Society's purposes. 20

15

H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, H.R. Rep. No. 2322, at 11

(1958).
16

36 U.S.C. § 40502(3) (1999) (emphasis added).
Id. § 40502(2).
18
Id. § 40503(a).
19
Id. §§ 40505-06.
20
See CONGRESSIONAL MEDAL OF HONOR SOCIETY, http://www.
cmohs.org (last visited Dec. 2, 2011). The Society's activities in
this regard are aided and supported by the Congressional Medal
of Honor Foundation, a charitable· corporation founded by the
Society. See CONGRESSIONAL MEDAL OF HONOR FOUNDATION, http://
www.cmohfoundation.org (last visited Dec. 2, 2011).
17

12
C. The Phrase "Congressional Medal of
Honor" Functions as a Collective Membership Mark
The federal government has reserved use of the
phrase, "Congressional Medal of Honor," as an identifier for recipients of the Medal so that they may
designate their status as recipients and as members
of the Society. Under the federal Lanham Act, governmental entities may own, register, and enforce trademarks, including collective membership marks. 21 The
owner of a collective membership mark need not be a
collective organization itself but may form a collective
for the benefit of specific individuals, just as the
federal government has done in chartering the Society
for the benefit of Medal recipients. 22 See In re Stencil
21

15 U.S.C. § 1054 (2006) (Lanham Act authorization for
"nations, States, municipalities, and the like" to register collective marks). Examples of federally-registered collective membership marks belonging to a department or agency of the U.S.
government include: "SEAL," U.S. Reg. No. 3,285,473, indicating
membership in an organization that develops and executes
military missions involving special operations strategy, doctrine,
and tactics, registered by the Department of the Navy; "MEDICAL RESERVE CORPS" and Design, U.S. Reg. No. 3,007,633,
indicating membership in a group of service-providers who have
an established group of practicing and retired physicians,
nurses, and other health professionals to act' in a coordinated
manner in times of local emergencies, registered by the Office of
the Surgeon General; "AIRBORNE A A" and design, U.S. Reg.
No. 2,487,176, indicating membership in the U.S. Army 82nd
Airborne Division, registered by the Department of the Army.
22
Congress has chartered other collective organizations for
the benefit of recipients and their family members of other military medals referenced in 18 U.S.C. § 704, specifically medals
(Continued on following page)

r
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13

Aero Engineering Corp., 170 U.S.P.Q. 292, 293 (T.T.A.B.
1971). The owner need only exercise legitimate control over the group and its members' use of the mark.
Id. at 293. Congress asserts control over the Society's
use of the phrase "Congressional Medal of Honor" by
chartering the Society for purposes that include guarding against exploitation of the name of the Medal and
protecting and preserving the reputation of the Medal.
Further, Congress controls use of the phrase for selfidentification purposes by restricting membership in
the collective to actual Medal recipients.
Collective membership marks differ from traditional trademarks in that they do not indicate the
commercial origin of goods or services; they serve
solely to indicate membership in a group, such as a
fraternal society, a cooperative, or a trade union. See
Zimmerman v. National Association of Realtors, 70
U.S.P.Q.2d 1425, 1428 n.6 (T.T.A.B. 2004) (citing
Ex Parte The Supreme Shrine of the Order of the
White Shrine of Jerusalem, 109 U.S.P.Q. 248, 249-50
(Comm'r. Pat. 1956)). In this case, the phrase "Con- gressional Medal of Honor" operates as a collective
referenced in § 704(d) for which misrepresentation results in
enhanced penalties. The Legion of Valor of the United States of
America, Inc., is authorized to extend membership to the
recipients, their parents and lineal descendants, of the Distinguished Service Cross, the Navy Cross, the Air Force Cross, and
the Medal of Honor. 36 U.S.C. § 130303 (1999). Similarly, the
Military Order of the Purple Heart of the United States of
America, Inc., may extend membership to the recipients of the
Purple Heart Medal and their immediate families. 36 U.S.C.
§ 140503 (1999 & Supp. 2011).

14
membership mark by designating the only individuals eligible to be members of the Congressional Medal
of Honor Society. Al.though collective membership
marks may be federally registered, they need not be
in order to be enforceable. See The National Board of
the Young Women's Christian Association of the U.S.A.
v. Young Women's Christian Association of Charleston,
South Carolina, 335 F.Supp. 615, 623 (D.C.S.C. 1971).
Section 704(b) of Title 18 provides a mechanism for
enforcing rights in the phrase "Congressional Medal
of Honor" against false association or affiliation without any requirement that the phrase be federally
· registered. 23

IV. The First Amendment Permits Congress
to Prohibit Infringement of the "Congressional Medal of Honor" Collective Membership Mark
If the Court were to accept the argument that
§ 704(b) functions as a trademark statute prohibiting
infringement of the "Congressional Medal of Honor"
collective membership mark, it would not need to
decide the broad and ramified question of whether
23

Congress has authorized criminal penalties for counterfeiting of the unregistered marks of another congressionally
chartered organization, the U.S. Olympic Committee. See 18
U.S.C. § 2320(e)(l)(B) (2000 & Supp. 2011) (unauthorized use
of marks identical to or substantially indistinguishable from
trademarks listed in 36 U.S.C. § 220506(a) (1999), including the
word "Olympic," constitutes criminal counterfeiting without
requiring proof of federal registration).

15
false statements of fact are categorically beyond the
reach of the First Amendment except when necessary
to protect speech that matters. Rather, the Court
could uphold the constitutionality of the statute's
application to those, such as Alvarez, who falsely
claim to have been awarded the Congressional Medal
of Honor under the First Amendment analysis prescribed in San Franc;isco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v.
United States Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522, 53541 (1987). 24

San Francisco Arts & Athletics involved a First
Amendment challenge to the constitutionality of a
federal statute that granted the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) the right to prohibit certain
commercial and promotional uses of the word "Olympic." See id. at 532-41. Exercising that right, the
USOC obtained an injunction prohibiting the petitioner from promoting an athletic event under the
name "Gay Olympic Games." Id. at 525-27. Petitioner
challenged the injunction before this Court, arguing
in relevant part that the statute violated the First
Amendment by authorizing the USOC to prohibit use
of the word "Olympic" without showing that such use
was likely to confuse the public. 25 Id. at 532.

24

The undersigned reiterate that their argument addresses
only the First Amendment implications of 18 U.S.C. § 704(b).
See supra note 2.
25
Like its civil counterpart, the criminal statute prohibiting
counterfeiting of the U.S. Olympic Committee's trademarks does
(Continued on following page)

16
In assessing petitioner's argument, the Court concluded that the constitutionality of the infringement
on petitioner's commercial and promotional speech
rights worked by the statute should be assessed
under variants of intermediate First Amendment
scrutiny. See id. at 535-41. Insofar as petitioner was
precluded from engaging in commercial speech, the
Court applied the test authorized in Central Hudson
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of
New York, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (a restriction on
non-misleading commercial speech is valid if the
government's interest in the restriction is substantial,
if the restriction directly advances the government's
asserted interest, and if it is no more extensive than
necessary to serve the interest). See San Francisco
Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at 537 n.16. Insofar as
petitioner was precluded from engaging in noncommercial speech, the Court applied the balancing
test applicable to measures that incidentally restrict
speech while seeking to further substantial non-speech
purposes prescribed in United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367, 377 (1968). San Francisco Arts & Athletics,
483 U.S. at 537 n.16. Explaining that the application
of these two balancing tests to the facts of the case
was "substantially similar," id., the Court concluded
that the challenged statute passed constitutional
muster. See id. at 537-41.

not require proof of a likelihood of confusion. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2320(e)(l)(B) (2000 & Supp. 2011).
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If the Court were to read§ 704(b) as a trademark
infringement statute similar to the statute upheld
against a First Amendment challenge in San Francisco Arts & Athletics, and if the Court were to follow the
lines of reasoning adopted and applied in that case, it
could uphold against a First Amendment challenge
the statute's prohibition on falsely claiming to have
been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor.
Insofar as the statute prohibits one from falsely
making such a claim in the course of commercial selfpromotion, the infringement would constitl:lte a lawful
restriction on false or misleading commercial speech.
See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. Insofar as the
statute prohibits one from making such a claim in a
non-commercial context, certainly the incidental
restriction on one's ability to tell this particular lie
could not possibly outweigh Congress's strong interest in preserving the dignity of the Nation's highest
military honor. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.

CONCLUSION
In summary, the undersigned do not take the
position that the Court should vacate the Ninth Circuit's judgment and uphold the constitutionality of
Alvarez's conviction under a trademark infringement
analysis. Rather, the undersigned wish to apprise the
Court of the potential applicability of such an analysis as it considers the question presented, and, more
generally, of their view that resolution of this case
does not necessarily require the Court to decide

18
whether false statements of fact are invisible to the
First Amendment except in circumstances where they
are necessary to protect speech that matters.
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